Stirner's work "The Ego and Its Own" (Der Einzige und sein Eigentum), by its fundamental conception and frank advocacy of the principle of self-centered individualism, reminds one of Macchiavelli's work, "The Book of Princes." Stirner is the most consistent modern champion of the individualist-anarchist, or bourgeois, manner of thought, which is represented in literature by such stars as Schopenhauer, Hartmann, Nietzsche, Hauptmann, Ibsen, Lombroso, D'Annunzio, Tolstoi, Maeterlinck, or men like Chamberlain and Brooks Adams. For this reason, we shall employ "The Ego and Its Own" for the purpose of illustrating the proletarian monist method of research and world-conception, elaborated for the first time on the basis of a theory of understanding by Joseph Dietzgen, by comparing this theory with the dualist bourgeois conception of the mind and of the world.

Stirner is unique, stimulating, and brilliant in his negative criticism of the supernatural belief in the creative power of the absolute, or "pure" spirit. But he fails completely, and becomes himself sterile and bewitched, as soon as a positive criticism of his subject is demanded. On this field, he has long been outdone by the historical materialism of Marx and Engels and the theory of understanding of Dietzgen.

Stirner declared war against all spooks and their supporters, because christianity, liberalism, and utopian communism, instead of seeing through the hallucinations of the so-called pure spirit and its catchwords of god, liberty, morality, law, state, society, authority, etc., welcomed it and its creatures as allies for the degradation and enslavement of the individual. However, while Stirner flattered himself with having discovered an impregnable method of combat, he did not follow the example of Marx and Engels, who confronted the aprioristic hallucinations with the sober demonstration of the historical fact, that they were but necessary phenomena and companions of tendencies, which are conditioned on particular processes of social life and cannot, therefore, disappear until these do. Nor did it occur to him to forge a mighty weapon against obsolete conceptions after the manner of Dietzgen, who, inspired by historical materialism, deepened and elaborated it into a conception of the world by means of his analysis of the force of thought and understanding which revealed the dependence of the human mind on social conditions as well as its interrelation with nature and the universe. We shall show in the following lines, that Dietzgen's theory of understanding was the first to thus completely demonstrate the fantastic nature of all purely deductive abstractions and of the "pure" spirit. Stirner does not do anything of the kind, but contents himself with pointing out the injuriousness of pure catchwords for the trusting individual, without suspecting the social and cosmic origin and basis of those catchwords. Consequently he necessarily remains in the same circle of mental hallucinations as his bourgeois opponents. And accordingly he recommends as a panacea -- the same as all anarchists after him -- that the consciously egoistic self, that is to say the individual with his psycho-physical power, who considers himself above society, be seated upon the world-throne as an individual and independent power, enjoying in his capacity of autocrat and hyper-man only individual rights, without regard to society and nature and without any duties.

Stirner's ideas are not completely intelligible, unless one takes into consideration the most advanced intellectual tendencies preceding the March revolution, under whose influence he wrote his work. In this category belong especially the speculative communism of Babeuf, Proudhon, and Weitling, the first attempts of critical communism made by Marx and Engels in the "Deutsch-Franzoesischen Jahrbuecher" (German-French Annals), in March, 1844, which Stirner understood merely in an ideological way, furthermore Hegel's dialectic, and finally Feuerbach's realistic humanitarianism (The Essence of Christianity) and Bauer's idealistic humanitarianism (in the "Allgemeine Literaturzeitung ").

In this storm and stress period, Stirner deserves mention as one of the most brilliant minds of liberal intellectualism, excelling by his quaint natural wit and his artistic imagination.

In his vain struggle with the ideological method of speculation and its spook of a pure spirit, he has many a flash of bright thought, which strikes one like that of some modern thinker, making a passionate appeal to one's selfreliance and independent thought, selfdependence and selfemancipation, as opposed to the servile degradation of one's personality by religious, philosophical, liberal, and social spooks. It is this spirited appeal to selfrespect, which constitutes the important merit of Stirner's work, for by means of it he creates at least strong doubts as, to the authority of any and all spooks, which are the creations of the aprioristic conceptions of the clerically divine, liberally moral, and socially humanitarian ideologies.

Stirner also takes occasion to say words full of warmth and strength about the proletariat, without, however, realizing the definite historical role of this class and economic category of society.

The entire work of Stirner is pervaded as much by his strong side, the negative ridicule of the catchwords of speculative idealism, as by his weak side, the fantastic and idealistic deification of pure egoism.

The reader will look in vain for some positive point of vantage in this hymn of egoism. It has neither bottom nor boundaries. Stirner is not content to use egoism as an indispensable and sound weapon against the hypocritical, sentimental, and servile self-denial, which is being preached by the priesthood of all creeds. Instead, he has such an exaggerated and fantastic conception of egoism, that it loses all definite outlines and becomes quite as much of a spook as the clerical and liberal liberty, law, humanity, authority, etc.

With equal lack of insight into the natural differentiation and at the same time natural unity of all things and phenomena christianity worships the spirit of god, liberalism the spirit of the individual, Hegel the absolute ideal, Feuerbach human love. And so Stirner worships self-love. In his egoism, the immediate, more remote, and most remote personal interests all merge without distinction into one, so that love, self-sacrifice, self-denial, and even self-destruction have an indiscriminate place in it.

It is this peculiar anti-dialectic conception of abstract ideas, which gives to Stirner such a confused notion of egoism, and of the importance and power of the individual separated from society, and by this means he places his followers, the anarchists of every shade and the supermen of the Nietzsche stamp, on strained terms with all sober logic.

Experience teaches, that a man becomes possessed as soon as he falls so completely into thraldom to catchwords, that he only believes in them and makes no conscious effort to analyse them and bring them into accord with the array of facts which can be tested empirically. With naive faith, superstition and fantasy simultaneously begin their confusing play. Then the intellectuals among the liberal and confessional preachers know how to inaugurate their partly brilliant, partly artistic, scintillation of words, which enables the shrewdest of them to hoodwink the gullible. It is a perplexing music which the leading preachers make for their faithful lambs in order to fish in troubled waters, either consciously or unconsciously. Among others, apart from Stirner, it is by the way, especially Nietzsche, who is such an unconscious fisherman, and who even excels his master in his confusion of abstract ideas. In spite of the perfect form of such works as "Thus Spake Zarathustra," it will be hard to find any reader, who would be able to cull from this tinkling of words a single clear and new thought, which would stand the test of scientific analysis.

Because morality, order, law, the state, etc., have so long been employed as bogies, therefore Stirner opines that this whole plunder should be thrown away.

He derives the right of sterile negation from his extravagant lack of discernment. But for this very reason, Stirner cannot detach himself from faith and arrive at science. For him, in true bourgeois fashion, the dependent nature of the individual on the universe and society has remained as much of a riddle as the equally dependent nature of those abstract ideas. And thus he struggles helplessly in his own snares. Because the individual is abused by those catchwords, which neither the liberals nor himself could digest, therefore they have no right to existence at all in the opinion of Stirner and are supposed to fall at the mere command of his self, his individuality. And such a harebrained mentality is taken seriously by the anarchists, by Nietzsche, and his disciples!

The work of Stirner naturally ends in making a saint of the pure ego. This is the insane idea of the "Ego" and his unenviable "Property," as we shall now try to demonstrate more clearly.

We certainly agree with Stirner in opposing the priestly and ill-advised use of catchwords, but we do not spill the child with the bathing water. If Stirner had not himself remained entrapped in priestly conceptions, he would have made short work of the absolute sacredness of those great catchwords, by analysing them and demonstrating that they were relatively sacred, that is to say wholesome, according to time and place.

It is no wonder, that the fundamentally utopian statements of Babeuf, Proudhon, and Weitling did not lead the most typical apostle of anarchism into a new road. The same is also true of the romantic articles of Bruno Bauer. But at least Hegel's dialectics and Feuerbach's theses should have stimulated Stirner to more fertile thoughts than a mere negative critique, granted that such a critique on his part was in some respects justified, if he had only possessed a little more aptitude for historical interdependence and the theory of understanding.

For want of study of the laws of thought and society, Stirner's struggles for a positive conception of the world did not yield any clear result concerning the relation of the individual toward society and nature. This is the final reason that prevents him from culling the sound kernel from the catchwords which he criticises. It is therefore but a consistent act of helpless desperation and a bowing to the undefeated spooks, that he always hides behind the armour of a knight of pure egoism.

He sees, indeed, the interaction of mind and body and that of these two in society and nature, so that their mutual interdependence is revealed. But he does not arrive at a clear understanding of the degree and importance of the dependent role of the individual factors in this interrelation, because the actual mutuality and opposition of phenomena obscures for him their equally real social and cosmic unity. But it is this total interrelation of all phenomena, which compels man to distinguish the individual relations, according to their importance, by genera, species, classes, families, etc., in order to orient himself in the universe. Stirner lacks appreciation for the dialectics and interrelation of things and thoughts. Hence the understanding does not come to him, that the human individual, being a product of nature in body and soul, is so inseparably and universally connected with nature, that his growing individuality and power is conditioned on the increasing understanding and utilization of this natural, and socially ever-increasing, dependence. He ignores furthermore the fact, that such an understanding and utilization is not due to the individual personality as such, but to its capacity as a member of society and nature, because the individual can exist only in this capacity, and develop, gain power and exercise it by this means. And finally he remains ignorant of the fact, that a society and its egos are mainly determined, so far as the historical peculiarity of their existence is concerned, by the particular degree of development of the social forces of production of their time. This understanding came to Engels by a study of the English, to Marx by that of the French revolution, and it came to both of them at the time of Stirner. While Feuerbach had demonstrated, that men and human existence were not created by god (spirit, consciousness), but that man had created god after his own image, Marx, having studied also social science, taught furthermore: "It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence which determines their consciousness."

Mehring has shown in volume II of the "Posthumous Writings of Marx, Engels, and Lassalle," that Marx had found the enlightening sentences almost literally in the works of the oldest French socialists: "If man is formed by external circumstances, then circumstances must be modelled to suit man. If man is by nature social, then he can develop his true nature only in society, and the power of his nature must not be judged by the power of the single individual, but by that of his social surroundings." In the further development of this thought, Marx wrote in the "German-French Annals": "Not until the real, individual man discards the abstract citizen of the state and realises that he, as an individual, in his actual life, his individual work, his individual relations, is a generic being, not until man has organised his individual powers into social powers and ceased to separate his social powers from his political powers, will human emancipation be accomplished." (See Mehring, "Posthumous Writings, etc.," volume I, page 352, German edition.)

The Marxian term "generic being," which is plainly defined at this place as an individual conscious of his social power, is ridiculed by Stirner as an empty abstraction, because he did not know what to do with it from mere ideological narrow-mindedness. Stirner also passed without understanding by the other attempts at critical communism, which Engels published in the same periodical in his "Outlines For A Critique Of Political Economy."

"I have set my affairs on nothing." With this pert statement, Stirner begins and concludes his book.

It is not nature, the creator of the human individual, nor society, the supporter of his life, which are the determining powers, according to Stirner, but the single individual, who acknowledges them only so far as they serve him. But if they refuse to do him this favour, the individual places himself above nature and society and becomes -- a superman. "Why will you not take courage now to really make yourselves the central point and the main thing altogether? Why grasp in the air at freedom, your dream? Are you your dream? Do not begin by inquiring of your dreams, your notions, your thoughts, for that is all "hollow theory." Ask yourselves and ask after yourselves -- that is practical, and you know you want very much to be "practical." [...]Therefore turn to yourselves rather than to your gods or idols. Bring out from yourselves what is in you, bring it to the light, bring yourselves to revelation." Thus speaks Stirner.

And how does he propose to realise this? Very simple! "I secure my freedom with regard to the world in the degree that I make the world my own, "gain it and take possession of it" for myself, by whatever might, by that of persuasion, of petition, of categorical demand, yes, even by hypocrisy, cheating, etc.; for the means that I use for it are determined by what I am." And again, " My freedom becomes complete only when it is my -- might; but by this I cease to be a merely free man, and become an own man. Why is the freedom of the peoples a "hollow word"? Because the peoples have no might! With a breath of the living ego I blow peoples over, be it the breath of a Nero, a Chinese emperor, or a poor writer."

These words remind one of "Uncle Braesig," who thought he had explained poverty, when he called it "pauvreté." Without power no liberty; but how do I get power? All that Stirner has to say in reply is that power dwells in myself, in the individual, who becomes a self-possessed free man, when he brings forth power out of himself. The "free" will of the individual is supposed to suffice for this purpose! Leaving aside the fact that Stirner himself has nothing but words to show in substantiation of his claim -- for we learn from his biographer that he ended in poverty and misery in spite of his mighty Ego -- where are there in authenticated history any individuals endowed with such mighty wills and power by their own unaided personality? The superhumanly powerful role ascribed by historical fables to chiefs of savage hordes, those "self-owned free men" by virtue of their physical strength and ability, has been reduced to its modest and dependent measure, and no one has accomplished this more thoroughly than Lewis H. Morgan in his "Ancient Society." We need not, therefore, pause for any further consideration of the exaggerated power of such "strong men." The "self-owned" power of the ego is merely that spleen, of which Stirner cannot rid himself. This is his misfortune and that of all liberals, who have this in common with the anarchists and the autocrats, in short with the entire bourgeoisie, that they believe, in perfect harmony with their system of free competition, in the spook of the self-possessed free individual. It is the merit of Marx, Engels, and Dietzgen, to have demonstrated, that the fundamental explanation for this dogma, which deserves a place by the side of the infallibility of the pope, is found in definite conditions of production and existence giving rise to the dualistic method of thought of a bourgeoisie operating with absolute contradictions.

Marx and Engels have shown more clearly than their predecessors the role of the individual as a social power, while Dietzgen fortified and extended this proof, which is of such great consequence for the study of society and history, by showing in his theory of understanding that the human faculty of thought is no more and no less than an ordinary cosmic force and phenomenon, and that it is in its activity absolutely dependent upon the connection with other natural phenomena. In this way Dietzgen cleared the road for a scientific conception of the world. On the other hand, whether we believe with the worshippers of a god in a supernatural being, or with the liberals in a supernatural human spirit and will, we believe in the same dualism and agree in the last analysis with the anarchist confusion concerning the position of the personality in society and nature.

Religious dualism: God and nature; liberal dualism: intangible spirit and tangible matter; anarchist dualism: individual and society -- nature.

The dualistic relationship between the believers in a god, free thinkers, and anarchists is palpable. For the believers in a god, the rule of the individual over mankind is a divine dogma; for the liberals, it is a spiritual dogma; and for the anarchists, it is a demand of the "free" personality. For all three of them, this dualism obstructs their grasp of the monistic interrelation of individuals, society, and nature, thus preventing their radical rupture with all spooks.

Stirner ridicules the universal abstract liberty, but clings to an equally abstract power of the "self-owned" ego. However, he does not take the least trouble trying to expose this power and its anything but individual origin.

In opposition to him, Engels, standing on the shoulders of Hegel, drew the veil from the verbose individuality and will-power of Stirner 'With the following words, to be found in his "Anti-Dühring": "Hegel was the first to correctly represent the relation of freedom and necessity. For him, freedom consisted in the understanding of necessity. Necessity is "blind" only to the extent that it is not understood. Freedom is not found in the fancied independence from laws of nature, but in the understanding of these laws and the resulting possibility to make them produce definite effects according to our plans. This applies equally to the laws of nature outside of society and to those which regulate the physical and intellectual well-being of man inside of it, for these two classes of laws, while they may be separated in thought, cannot be held apart in reality. Freedom of will means, therefore, simply the faculty of making decisions based on understanding. The more a man's judgement concerning a certain question is free, the greater will be the necessity by which the substance of this judgement is determined. On the other hand, ignorance engenders a vaccination, which chooses between various opposing possibilities with apparent arbitrariness, but proves by this very fact its lack of freedom, its subjection to the very thing, which it ought to dominate. Freedom therefore consists of our control over ourselves and nature based on an understanding of natural necessities. Hence it is as a matter of course a product of historical development."

We observe, then, that Engels understands the art of combining freedom and necessity dialectically, by declaring that freedom results as a historical product from a study of necessity and its social and natural interrelations, in such a way that any one may make the test himself and thus arrive at a scientific understanding. In the same way, Marx shows that the power of the individual is from natural necessity a social power, and that the past great struggles of mankind were fundamentally social and class struggles. We thereby secured practical illustrations of the fertility of the critical and inductive method taking its departure consciously from facts and classifying them into laws, or rules. Both Marx and Engels were enabled by this method to secure quite as exact results on the field of historical, economic and political science, as natural science, strictly speaking, in its own field. On the other hand, the purely deductive method, resting on the irreconciled antagonism of a supernatural mind and natural matter, which made it dualistic, has demonstrated its scientific impotence, because it pretended to derive understanding in an a priori fashion, that is, independently of an analysis of the general 'laws of experienced facts, by means of "pure" spirit. So far as the past is concerned, we are obliged to recognise that the fantasies generated by the purely deductive method had a certain merit, because they were a necessary social product of their time, which made further progress possible. But in our day, these fanciful imaginations have become injurious and reactionary on account of changed social conditions, and even Stirner's example proves this.

The substantiation of the critical and inductive method by means of the analysis and synthesis of understanding and nature, and the demonstration of its fertile and consistently monistic applicability to all social and cosmic phenomena, was the particular work of Joseph Dietzgen. It accompanied the rise of the proletariat, which assisted Marx and Engels in realizing the nature of social movements and interrelations. Their studies enabled Dietzgen to make another step forward by founding the monistic conception of the world on his theory of understanding.

Seeing that the consistently dialectic and monistic, or critically inductive, method of thought with its cosmic crowning was a necessary concomitant of the rise of the proletariat as a social-economic class and had for its premise the existence of such a class, we are justified in calling it the proletarian method. This term is furthermore fitting for the reason that all other social classes, owing to their economic interests, are necessarily advocates of the dualistic, or purely deductive method of thought, in all fields of abstraction, such as those of the state, society, morality, freedom, etc. If we comprise all ruling classes on account of the identity of their interests as opposed to those of the proletariat as one bourgeois class, then we find that this economic antagonism expresses itself also as an antagonism of the bourgeois and proletarian method of thought. On one side we have the bourgeois, dualistic, or purely deductive method, on the other the proletarian, dialectically monistic, or critically inductive method. This applies even to the most advanced bourgeois natural scientists in every case, where they pass from their specialties to the fields of the so-called science of the intellect.

How is it, now, that a proletarian arrives more easily at a consistently monistic method of thought, and at a clearer understanding of social and cosmic interrelations?

Is it, perhaps, because proletarians are individuals of deeper insight and better than men of other classes? By no means. So far as personality is concerned, a proletarian is equipped no better than a bourgeois. That which distinguishes him to his advantage from a bourgeois is not due to him as an individual, but as a member of a definite economic class. Being a member of the wage-working class, of the proletariat, he is left by virtue of his economic condition with no other inalienable property but his 'intellectual and physical labour-power. This state of things carries with it the growing understanding of the fact that his might and power are not due to his own unaided individuality, but to his connection with the labour-power of his class. The proletarian is thus taught by his economic condition, that he must use his power as a social one. By this means he becomes class-conscious, conscious of the importance and power of his class in society. It is not difficult to understand, that the socialist aim of the socialization of the means of production must necessarily follow from this class-consciousness. The bourgeois, on the contrary, being an advocate of the private ownership of the means of production, favours the opposite individualistic representation of his interests. If a bourgeois unites with the members of his class, he does so merely under the pressure of competition or of the proletarian organization, but always with the reservation of Stirner to the effect that the "freedom" of his organization shall permit him at any moment to sell his shares and leave his club as soon as it interferes with his individualist principles. He is enabled, by virtue of the above-named property, to avail himself of the "freedom" of his association, of course at the expense of others. Not so the proletarian. His economic condition necessarily prescribes to him a permanent association with equals, who shall use the means of production co-operatively for their common interest, in order to secure for each member the greatest possible happiness in the freest development of his or her physical and intellectual faculties. Owing to the fact, that no society, not even one without privileges, can exist without definite regulations, and that among equals two are more powerful than one, the majority determines the rules of common work and life for all. This is resented by the individualism of the liberals and anarchists, because they want to be more than equals, that is to say, supermen. Unfortunately for them, necessity enforces its decrees against all pious wishes. And this necessity consists of the fatal law compelling everybody's dependence on socially useful labour, without which even the greatest genius cannot live. The liberal-anarchist dream of the ego and his absolute property, free from the bonds of society, could not be realised, even if nature were to grant freely and lavishly the most excessive demands for food, clothing and shelter. For even in that case, we should still be bound to respect definite laws regulating the association of men in such a way that the development and care of all would be promoted, including minors and sick, children and aged.

In order to be able to use the proletarian, consistently monistic, conception and its critically inductive method with assurance, we must first become aware of the perversity of the liberal-anarchist, self-centered, dualist mode of thought, and overcome its allegedly aprioristic and deductive method.

An isolated man in his natural state is helpless against the forces of nature, which include other men and wild animals. He must rely for protection and sustenance on the assistance of his fellowmen. Therefore he associates with them from necessity. But the overpowering forces of nature, such as fire, wind, water, disease, inspire him with fear, because he does not understand and know how to control them. He feels that they threaten his existence. Therefore he tries to meet these mysterious forces by equally mysterious measures. The first result of the feeling of helpless dependence on nature was the rise of religious cults. These cults remained natural religions, so long as man had not learned to understand the natural character of elementary forces and to make them tributary to himself. Later on, the dual nature of individual power, which is at the same time individual and socially cosmic, tormented man with religious pains. Natural religion then became spiritual religion, transforming the idolization of nature and of the present world into an idolization of the spirit and the next world. History teaches us in accord with the theory of understanding, that this transformation took place in the course of thousands of years as a corollary of the transition from communist property in means of production to private property. So long as men lived in primitive communities and applied their individual powers directly as social ones, natural religion prevailed. Exchange of products with neighbouring communes, in other words, the removal of products outside of the producing commune, did not arise, until the individual communes had raised their productive power to the point where they could produce more than they needed for their own consumption. For a time, the commune remained the owner of the articles of exchange in the interest of its members. But no sooner did the products find a market outside of the commune, than the wedge of dissolution was driven into primitive communism. As a rule those individuals, who had the function of placating the idols, or who had some other prominent social position, succeeded by means of their authority in managing the exchange of products for their own benefit and transforming themselves from servants into masters of the commune, by securing control of the means of production. The institution of such private ownership was naturally the end of communism. The way was cleared for the development of the production of commodities, leading toward modem capitalism. The assumption of superiority on the part of an individual over society, as a permanent feature, was made possible only by private ownership, which on its part owed its rise to a definite point of development of the productive forces of the commune. Thanks to private property, the power of the individual seemed to be due less to social labour and to the further interrelation with nature, than to his own individuality. The articles of exchange of such independent individuals necessarily assumed the character of commodities, owing to the lowly developed state of the productive forces. By this means, the plain social nature of individual labour in the commune assumed the mysterious character of products of individual labour, of commodities. Individualism triumphed over communism. The gods of nature of consciously social men gave way to the supernatural gods of individuals misapprehending their own social and cosmic interrelations. Individual property led to the condensation of polytheism into monotheism. Finally the "pure" spirit of the individual became the god of "enlightened" capitalism. just as the virgin Mary of the catholics gave birth to Christ without having become pregnant, so pure reason begets thought without being impregnated by the objects of sense perception. Thus results the unconditional and aprioristic "science," which is still being taught quite generally by the modern universities. The characteristic mark of this science is that it takes its departure from the principle of pure spirit. Hence it remains theological and theosophical. We propose to confront it later with proletarian science, which takes its departure consciously from verifiable and matter of fact premises.

The indissoluble interrelation of the individual with society rests, according to us, on his helplessness, if left with no other resource for his maintenance and defence but his own labour-power. Man is, therefore, compelled to seek the assistance of other men. This dependence explains the inevitable social nature of individual labour-power. Marx calls the understanding of this nature of individual labour-power the essential point which is required for an intelligent discussion of political economy. It is the great merit of Marx and Engels to have substantiated and propagated this knowledge. This is the basis of the analyses in Marx's "Capital", this reveals the dual nature of private property, this furnishes the key for an understanding of the nature of commodities, value, money, capital, and of the entire social science. It also lays bare the kernel of such terms as morality, right, state, authority, etc.

It was the misfortune of Stirner to regard these terms as arbitrary catchwords, while the Marxian Dietzgen knows how to show up the sober social nature of these spooks. With regard to morality, he says in his "Nature of Human Brain Work": "Morality is the aggregate of the most contradictory ethical laws which serve the common purpose of regulating the conduct of man toward himself and others in such a way that the future is considered as well as the present, the one as well as the other, the individual as well as the genus. The individual man finds himself lacking, inadequate, limited, in many ways. He requires for his complement other people, society, and must, therefore, live and let live. The mutual concessions which arise out of these relative needs are called morality."

"The inadequacy of the single individual, the need of association, is the basis and cause of man's consideration for his neighbours, of morality. Now, since the one who feels this need, man, is necessarily an individual, it follows that his need must likewise be individual and more or less intensive. And since my neighbours are necessarily different from me, it requires different considerations to meet their needs. Concrete man needs a concrete morality. just as abstract and meaningless as the concept of mankind in general is that of absolute morality, and the ethical laws derived from this vague idea are quite as unpractical and unsuccessful. Man is a living personality, whose welfare and purpose is embodied within himself, who has between himself and the world nothing but his needs as a mediator, who owes no allegiance to any law whatever from the moment that it contravenes his needs. The moral duty of an individual never exceeds his interests. The only thing which exceeds those interests is the material power of the generality over the individuality."

If we regard it as the function of reason to ascertain that which is morally right, a uniform scientific result may be produced, if we agree at the outset on the persons, conditions, or limits within which the universal moral right is to be determined; in other words, we may accomplish something practical, if we drop the idea of absolute right and search for definite rights applicable to well-defined purposes by clearly marking the boundaries of our problem. The contradiction in the various standards of morality, and the many opposing solutions of this contradiction, are due to a misunderstanding of the problem. To look for right without a given quantity of sense perceptions, without some definite working material, is an act of speculative reason, which pretends to explore nature without the use of senses. The attempt to arrive at a positive determination of morality by pure perception and pure reason is a manifestation of the philosophical faith in understanding a priori."

And with regard to right, Dietzgen writes in the same work Reason cannot discover within itself any positive rights or absolutely moral codes any more than any other speculative truth. It cannot estimate how essential or unessential a thing is, or classify the quantity of its concrete and general characters, until it has some perceptible material to work upon. The understanding of the right, or of the moral, like all understanding, strives to single out the general characteristics of its object. But the general is only possible within certain definite limits, it exists only as the general qualities of some concrete and perceptible object. And if any one tries to represent some maxim, some law, some right, in the light of an absolute maxim, law, or right, he forgets this necessary limitation. Absolute right is merely a meaningless concept, and it does not assume even a vague meaning, until it is understood to stand for the right of mankind in general. But morality, or the determination of that which is right, has a practical purpose. Yet, if we accept the general and unconditional right of mankind as a moral right, we necessarily miss our practical aim. An act, or a line of action, which is universally or everywhere right, requires no law for its enforcement, for it will recommend itself. It is only the determined and limited law, adapted to certain persons, classes, nations, times, or circumstances, which has any practical value, and it is so much more practical, the more defined, exact, precise and the less general it is."

What signifies, furthermore, the state which Stirner denies offhand and which individuals are supposed to be able to blow over by sheer will-power? It is well known to be nothing else but the executive committee of the ruling minority, who can impose their rule, thanks to the private ownership in means required for the production of the material necessities of life, so long as this rule and this private ownership are necessary for the development of the productive forces to a climax where the development of personality becomes possible for all. With the advent of this climax, and after the victorious struggle of the proletariat, driven forward by its material requirements, minority rule, or the state, disappears and gives way to universal suffrage and rule. Where all rule, nobody serves, and vice versa, where all serve, nobody rules. We refer the reader, who would inform himself or herself further about this point, to Kautsky's "Erfurt Program" or to Marx's "Capital." These works will throw a bright light on some more catchwords of Stimer.

The elaboration and demonstration of the following axioms: The human individual is a social labourer, and: Human labour is a social organism, which determines the nature of the interior world of the individual member, that is, his consciousness and mental activity in all lines of thought such as religion, ethics, law, politics, science and art, by producing changes in the economic nature of the society and the world surrounding him,-- are the fundament of Marxism in a strict sense. They furnish the key for an understanding of critical communism as a science of society and a conception of history.

Social labour produces the requirements for the existence of individuals,. The organization of the productive process is determined by the available forces of production, that is to say, by the means and methods of production. The degree of development of these determines the character of a society and its members. It explains the introduction of private property, slavery, feudalism, and capitalism. It justifies on the ground of historical necessity the rule of minorities as well as the abolition of class-rule by the proletariat. We are indebted for this knowledge to Marxism in the strict sense.

However, this scientific theory, known as Historical Materialism, which is substantiated by a critical investigation of any period where sufficient economic facts were so far available and looked into, does not satisfactorily reply to the question, why mental activity is to such a determinating degree influenced by economics. Is our mind not free to think as it pleases? Such, at least, is the belief of most people and even of many socialists who, therefore, consider Marxism rather as one-sided and dogmatic.

Thanks to the epistemological researches of Joseph Dietzgen, Marxism was here again confirmed and, besides, expanded. It now culminates in these additional proofs: The force of thought operates only by means of an inseparable interrelation with material furnished by sense perceptions. This material exists not only in thought, but also in an objective and perceptible form as a part of the cosmos, that universal organism which is the premise of all others. Hence all phenomena, including the force of thought and the human individual endowed with it, are organic members of the cosmos, and this natural, infinite, and organic interrelation is the long-sought final and unitary explanation for -- all phenomena. By substantiating these theses with his critique of understanding, Dietzgen has furnished the reply to the question, why it is that within the universal interrelation economics has a predominating influence over mental activity. In this way Dietzgen deepened and perfected the Marxian conception of social evolution and elaborated it into a scientific conception of the world. Herein lies the significance of Dietzgen's life's work.

Dietzgen left no bulky volumes behind him. He was not a professional writer, and the struggle for existence granted him no leisure, save for occasional writings. So much the more valuable is the little that he wrote. The fact that his importance for Marxism has not been duly recognized so far is partly attributable to Dietzgen's great bashfulness and reserve, and to his excessive confidence in the perspicacity of his readers. Thus, in all his works, more particularly in his "Excursions of a Socialist into the Domain of the Theory of Understanding" and in "The Outcome of Philosophy," he gives any reader not familiar with the positive work of classic philosophers the impression that he is discussing them rather than presenting his own researches. Nevertheless, the soberly scientific and cosmic theory of thought and conception of the universe presented in these works of his are the original achievement of Dietzgen, for which his predecessors have naturally built the steps, without, however, climbing to the height of this thinker. In order that Dietzgen's cosmic and monistic dialectics and its particular method of thought and enlightenment may be used in the service of the proletariat more than heretofore, it seems to us appropriate to emphasise at this point, that they are a valuable perfection, supplement, and therefore development, of Marxism. This is not the place for a complete demonstration of our claim. Here we simply desire to make use of the outlines of Dietzgen's consistent monism for an explanation of such terms as religion, conscience, infinity, and conception of the world, for which Stirner and the bourgeoisie vainly sought a clear and scientific understanding.

Whoever wishes to get a clear understanding of the world and its phenomena, must first grasp the relation of the human individual to nature. To this end, again, it is indispensable that we should have a clear perception of the force, by means of which we seek understanding. This is the force of understanding and thought, the human mind.

An analysis of this force shows, that we cannot think without any material furnished either in the present or the past by sense-perceptions. Thinking signifies, therefore, to operate the force of thought by means of material furnished by present sense-perceptions or by means of material of past sense-perceptions stored away in memory. This material is an indispensable premise of thought.

This fact may be substantiated by every one who will test himself and see whether he or she can formulate any thought, which did not originally arise in some way out of the contact of the mind with some material perception. If any one should present to us any term, which we cannot trace to some perceptible fact, then we cannot get any meaning out of it aside from the fact that we hear or read the mere word and later on repeat it in a similar connection without regard to other sense-perception and without formulating any clear idea, until we have experienced the perceptible mate of the mere term in some form. Our thought becomes so much clearer and more scientific, the more consciously it takes its departure from the critique of experienced facts, and vice versa it becomes so much more confused, the less we stick to experience and yield to imagination, that is to say, the more rein we give to inexperienced and therefore inexact reasoning without any conscious touch of reality. For this reason thoughts which are suggested to children, such as morality, liberty, justice, god, and devil, have such powerful influence over their minds, the same as fairy tales, because children are especially apt to assimilate ideas without criticism, on account of their untrained faculty of thought and their limited experience. What is true in this respect of children, applies also to nations in their childhood -- fantastic thought appeals to them more strongly than a scientific reference to verifiable facts.

Though Neo-Kantians and garret-philosophers claim that the world is merely a matter of consciousness, we know now that this is but a half-truth, for the world of phenomena exists not only in our consciousness, but also outside of it in perceptible reality, otherwise it would not exist for us at all. Consciousness does not register anything that has not been supplied by sense-perceptions. Indeed, the universal being, or the universe, consisting of intellectually and sensually perceivable phenomena, is the primary fact. It is not, in the last analysis, a product of man, but on the contrary, man is the product of the universe and to this extent the secondary fact.

We know this to be true as positively as we can know anything. In the first place, it is evident, that we human beings must first exist, before we can perceive any phenomenon. We cannot entertain the idea to attempt. without the premise of human existence, an analysis of the way in which the world of phenomena affects us, and to find out whether it exists merely in us as the content of our consciousness, or also outside of us as the thing which determines our consciousness in the last analysis. Otherwise we should not be trying to solve a problem, but suffer from insanity. The existence of man is, therefore, the first premise of human thought and research.

How do we prove, then, that, aside from the existence of man, the other premise of the psycho-physical interrelation, or of the inseparable connection of mind and senses characteristic of all thought, is the existence of material furnished by sense perceptions? That this material does not exist merely in human consciousness, but also has its own objective existence and is even the primary fact which produces men and their consciousness as secondary phenomena?

We answer: Our proof is given in no other way than all proofs are, namely, by reference to facts which are universally verifiable by experience. Such facts would not exist, and there could be neither any possibility of understanding nor any science in that case, unless there were phenomena outside of us which exist independently of individual man, although they can not exist for mankind independently of human consciousness. It is due only to this obvious fact that one man can convince another of the reality of some objective phenomenon and of its existence independently of himself, by making another perceive and experience the same phenomenon through his senses and intellect. We know and prove furthermore, that this same phenomenon still remains and continues to exist outside of our mind, even if we, as concrete Individuals, do not remember and perceive it any more with our senses.

Owing to the fact that man has the intellectual faculty of dispensing later on with the objective form of some phenomenon previously experienced at a certain time and place, and of studying its relations, especially as regards its origin and end, without further actual contact with it, and seeing that individual phenomena are relative and perishable as compared to the absolute universe, philosophers have hitherto attempted to disregard also the premise of this universe and to penetrate with their studies even beyond it. When they did not succeed in this, they did not overcome their traditional theological bias in order to arrive at the plain understanding that the absolute universe is the fundamental premise of their individual existence and their force of thought as well as the premise of the concrete existence and life of every individual phenomenon. On the contrary, their failure induced them to return to the mere faith in the supernatural existence of a god and finally to the faith in a supernatural pure spirit. Particularly since the time of Descartes (Cartesius) the pure spirit was elevated to the position of the only and actual being, while all other beings, things or phenomena were reduced to products of thought. The senses then appeared in the role of nonessential tools of the spirit, transmitting nothing but imaginary realities which had no existence, save in thought. This is the theological or dualist conception, for since it contradicts the experienced mind and all verifiable facts, and is, therefore, opposed to all science, it necessarily had to seek refuge in a divine spirit, or transform the human mind into an object of supernatural faith. By this means absolute dualism, or the contradiction between thinking and being, was established. Dietzgen finally solved this unreconciled contradiction, by pointing out the universally verifiable fact, that every individual phenomenon, including man and his force of thought, is not of itself whatever it is, but exists only in and derives its particularity from the connection with all other phenomena of nature, so that this natural and universal interrelation, this universal being, is recognized as the absolute and uniform premise for every concrete phenomenon. just as in a mathematical problem the solution is contained in the given magnitudes, without which the problem could not be solved at all, so the existence of the universal being, known as Cosmos, Universe or Nature, is the premise for the solution of every problem encountered by human beings. The possibility of understanding must be contained in the germ in human consciousness, for otherwise a more developed consciousness could never have arrived at it. Man cannot attempt to ask himself questions about the nature of consciousness, until this consciousness has developed. Not until man realised after many researches that he would have to make a special study of consciousness, did he perceive, that the process of thinking takes its departure from some given phenomenon furnished by sense-perceptions in such a way, that it exists objectively for us as well as for all others whose attention is called to it. And if man further analyses a given phenomenon, he finds that, on the one hand, it does not enter into his thoughts in all its details without leaving anything unknown about it, but rather retains its separate existence and can be further perceived by us and others, and, on the other hand, that every individual phenomenon does not exist in itself alone, but is always a link in that chain of existence which we call the universe. It is this chain of existence against which the individualist-anarchist bourgeois philosophers, whose starting point is the free will and independent mind, are rebelling. They do not like to abandon their self-centered aprioristic sailing of the clouds, nor trace their steps down to the universal being. In such fashion they come by their supernatural aim, the faith in some spook by which their own imagination deceives them. We, on the other hand, can lead them easily ad absurdum, for we have but to remember that thinking is the consciousness of being, an inseparable connection with some object outside of thought, the existence of which may be verified by sense-perceptions. Both this phenomenon and our faculty of thought must be given, before we can think. But if we have recognised that the universal existence outside of our force of thought is the absolute premise for our thought, then it is simply inane to attempt to go with our mind beyond this universal being to where there are neither phenomena nor thought. In order not to become inane, we must, therefore, make our peace with the universal existence and rest content with it. We know, then, that this existence is the absolute truth; we no longer search for abstract truth in general, but rather for the relative truth of given phenomena by extracting the general unity from the manifold contradictions, by separating the rule from the exceptions. And these scientific truths we find exclusively by a conscious reference to such verifiable parts of the universe as become the object of our study. We leave pure speculation and faith to the philosophers and theologians, and prefer to study and work by means of mind and senses. The theological conscience is seen to be nothing else but a vague and unconscious memory of conceptions that were originally gained in a psycho-physical manner. Therefore it belongs in the same class with faith and fantasy, and is called conscience as distinguished from science.

The fact that the human mind is compelled to connect itself with definite parts of the universe and take its departure from them in the quest after the general, the truth, the rule, or the law, implies that we constrict the concept of a universe ourselves, recognizing that it consists of parts which are organically arranged in time and space as well side by side as one following the other, limiting and supplementing one another. We understand, then, that the universe is the all-combining and all-embracing organic being, and that the mind, or consciousness, is one of its parts endowed with the peculiar power of serving as an instrument of orientation in the general interrelation. The universal existence is therefore recognized as the fundamental and absolute premise of our mind, and of all other phenomena, substances, or forces. We can affirm this in such a positive manner, because we found by the above test of the force of understanding that it can operate only by means of given natural origins and facts, and that these origins and facts are members, together with the subjective mind, of the infinite interrelations of nature, as any one may ascertain for himself.

Now we are at last done with speculations about absolute truth. For we have found it to be the absolute universe, the aggregate relations of all phenomena perceptible to psycho-physical man. Whatever does not partake of the psycho-physical nature of the universe, cannot exist for us. All spooks disband and stand revealed as products of fantasy, that is to say, as unconscious connections of the mind with objective sense-perceptions, present or past, provided we test them by a conscious combination of the mind with the senses.

The absolute and sober truth of the universe is recognized as the absolute eternity, the infinite, all-embracing, and all-combining, the thing independent of space and time, the beginning and end of all phenomena. The universe has all the attributes of divinity without its dualism, without that faith which would believe in a supernatural mind and a supernatural world apart from the natural mind and the natural world.

Whoever looks about with open eyes, sees that every phenomenon of nature is connected organically with innumerable others. Every one of them has countless causes, but only one general cause, the universe. In the universe we possess at last the reliable, monistic, and, therefore, logical beginning and end of a consistent conception of the world, which harmonizes with all the results of science.

What, then, does our thinking, understanding, explaining, etc., accomplish? Evidently nothing else than that it explains the cosmic phenomena in their direct and indirect interrelations, classifies them and arranges them for our orientation and use. The mind operates always post factum, that is to say, after having been furnished with material by objective sense-perceptions. Even prophesying has any meaning only when it is a conclusion from definite premises. Thinking, understanding, explaining, realizing, are so many terms for a formal classification and description of the interrelations of given phenomena. We think and understand truly when we know how to distinguish the essential or general from the unessential or exceptional of any given object. And since objective reality is the final test, any one can verify whether he has been thinking truly, as soon as he compares his thought with the available material of the studied object. Whenever we can do this, we are independent of any and all authority.

We declare that the universe is an organism, because we find it to be a universal fact that every phenomenon is that which it is not of itself, but by grace of its interrelation with the universe. A phenomenon is so much better understood the more we know about its interrelations. These change continually in time and space, hence a phenomenon does likewise. On account of this eternal movement, we are compelled to detach any phenomenon, which we desire to study, from out the flow of interrelations, to fix it in time and space. By this means we ascertain its direct relations and secure, as it were, a flashlight-picture of it as a reference specimen for further studies. In this way we obtain terms for concepts and boundaries, or distinctions, in the infinite universe. It is the cosmic and organic interrelation of simultaneous and successive, eternally changing phenomena, which explains the operations of the force of thought, showing that this force does not only create distinctions, but is also a unifying force aside from its discriminating nature.

Being a part of the cosmos, the human mind is cosmic, partakes of the eternal and infinite nature of the cosmos, the same as every substance and force. This universal miraculousness is natural for the entire cosmos. However, as a cosmic member associated with other cosmic members, and compared to the cosmos as a whole, the mind is limited in space and time and perishable. Only the cosmos as a whole remains unalterable and stable in spite of the eternal transformation of its parts. The indestructibility of matter and the conservation of energy are explained by the constancy of the cosmos. This is a demand of reason due to critical experience.

The inductive critique of the force of thought leads us to a cosmic dialectics, to an organic interrelation and interpenetration of all phenomena. It teaches us to conceive of every phenomenon as an organic part of the cosmos, and to make this our point of departure and of return as the given absolute truth and the uniform basis. The cosmos does not assume the aspect of an aprioristic fantasy, because it is the all-embracing and sober reality verifiable by every and all experience. The concept of the cosmic organism, being consciously constructed out of this reality, furnishes us with a basis for a consistent monism. It leaves no room for any other but the one and natural cosmos, which is the arch-premise and impassable boundary of our mind. To attempt to go beyond this ultimate boundary of existence is as foolish as the idea of ascertaining the nature of consciousness without any existence. Only he who attempts the one can attempt the other, in order to find in the fantasies of pure faith a fool's consolation. One who thinks like that is nearer to unconsciousness than to consciousness, and this is no compliment for his intellectual force.

	 "And then, above all other things,
	  Give metaphysics due concern.
	  Then strive to grasp by deep reflection
	  What is beyond the mind's conception."

These words characterise the essence of the purely deductive and unconditional "science." Or, to use another variation:

	"I tell you this: A man who speculates
	  Is like a beast upon some and heath,
	  Led in a circle by some evil sprite,
	  While round about is pasture fresh and green."

The human mind can form abstract concepts only by combining impressions derived from concrete objects and ascertaining in what respect they are generally identical. Hence we do not fully understand abstract concepts, until we have had practical intercourse with the concrete phenomena which are their premise. All concepts are more or less abstract and flexible. Because the parts of the universe, and our experiences relating to them, are in a process of continuous development, our concepts of them likewise remain fluid and flexible. The green pasture of the concrete phenomena turns into the and heath of abstract concepts as soon as we forget the interrelation of the latter with the former. The fact that this interrelation has been overlooked in the first place, is due to the circumstance that man, overawed by the supreme power of nature and the wealth of its phenomena, and feeling his dependence upon them, mistook the way of fantasy and faith for the only one which would lead to the blessedness of an explanation of the world satisfactory to the mind and heart. The faculty of memory, which permitted him to retain and collect past impressions, forsook him when it would have been proper for him to recollect the objective and perceptible origin of all impressions, especially after such great abstracta as god, morality, liberty, immortality, etc., had been instilled in his mind without criticism for generations in the shape of dogmas or eternal truths. It was not until he had reached a high stage of development, when an understanding of social and natural interrelations had convinced him more and more of the passing nature and relative truth of all dogmas, that he restored consciously this psycho-physical connection on one field of research after another. Many sciences had far advanced before the theory of understanding became scientific. An epoch-making advance in this direction is due to Kant, who ascertained that experience, that is to say, the interrelation of mind with sense-perceptions, is the indispensable premise of all science. But Kant left to faith the task of replying to so-called final questions concerning the origin and end of the universe and man, because he did not acquire a clear understanding of the relation of man to the cosmos. Owing to historical conditions, he was still so enveloped by traditional faith, particularly the faith in eternal moral law, that he did not even attempt to employ the only scientific method, namely, that of consciously connecting the mind with sense-perceptions, for the study of metaphysical riddles. What Kant failed to accomplish was carried further by Dietzgen, thanks to the higher social stage on which he stood. Dietzgen's "The Nature of Human Brain Work" is devoted to the analysis of the scientific method of thought. In this little work he ascertains that the inductive or empirical method of though is the one peculiar to the force of thought, that we cannot in reality think in any other way, but merely imagine we are doing so, because meditation is nothing else but associative elaboration, by means of memory, of the mental material obtained originally from objective sense-perceptions. But apart from many allusions, Dietzgen did not go very far beyond the standpoint of historical materialism in applying his method in this work, that is to say, he did not explicitly pass from the social to the cosmic interrelations. This is done, however, in his "Excursions" and in his "Outcome of Philosophy." Here he develops the dialectics of Marx and Engels, which is a theory of development through antagonisms to a higher stage, by perfecting it and pointing out that the universe is the last and highest organic unit, which combines monistically all other syntheses. By means of this understanding, the dialectics became a theory of the cosmic and organic interrelation and interpenetration of all phenomena. While in "The Nature of Human Brain Work" it was ascertained that phenomena exist outside and independently of individual man, in the "Excursions" and the "Outcome of Philosophy" the world of phenomena, the universe, or cosmos, were shown so to exist. Dialectics in its restricted sense found its culminating point in the cosmic interpretation. Antagonisms are henceforth recognized as merely relative, and the task of the mind is seen to consist in analyzing this relative nature. In the cosmic basis, we find the explanation of the fact that all antagonisms do not only exclude one another, but are also conditioned on one another. The point of view of an organic cosmos shows that all interrelations are parts of the absolute and come into opposition to each other as individual phenomena only because they mutually limit one another in time and space, being either contemporaneous or succeeding one another, in ceaseless flow. While Engels in his "Anti-Dühring" endeavours to show by many illustrations that the dialectic process is universal, not alone in society, but also in nature, Dietzgen reveals by means of his theory of understanding, by one stroke, as it were, that the dialectic movement is natural to all phenomena, seeing that they are all organic parts of the universe. All discoveries of natural and social science furnish daily further proofs for the correctness of this revelation by Dietzgen.

Now let us supplement Stirner's negative criticism of religion and world-conception positively by means of the positive critique of verifiable facts. The theory of understanding elaborated by Dietzgen is our pilot.

Religion arose from the feeling of human dependence on nature. Later this feeling was intensified by the equally inevitable feeling of infinity and the need for some unifying principle. Driven by his need to search for a final explanation of the world's phenomena, but as yet unable to see through the interrelations of society and nature, man misconstrued the natural final cause into a supernatural one. In this way, he created the metaphysical mode of thought, the absolute distinction between the natural and supernatural, which found its modern expression in the antagonism between physical matter and metaphysical spirit. This dualism is to blame for the habit of man to see only the differences, but not the interrelations and identities, in making distinctions. Man reasoned metaphysically, not dialectically. Stirner felt that the former method was wrong, but he did not succeed in escaping from metaphysics into physics. For we read in his work that he elevated the ego, the psycho-physical individual, to the position of the supreme and most powerful being. Now, if we mean by the term supreme being the most developed member of the cosmic organism, then the human individual is doubtless the highest being known to us. But inasmuch as every fellow-man is an equally supreme being, it follows that two men are more supreme and powerful than one. This relation of power is the basis of the rule of the majority among equals. A society of equals is evidently more powerful than any individual member, and the cosmos, finally, is more powerful than human society and any other phenomenon. Therefore, it is not the individual, who in the last analysis determines the world of phenomena, but it is the cosmos which determines the nature of body and soul of the individual. An egoist, who ignores the interrelation and interdependence of the individual on nature and society, injures himself and the community, and is possessed like Stirner. On the other hand, a man understanding these relations is useful to himself and society, he is a "free" egoist. Stirner is a dogmatist of the priestly order, inasmuch as the priestly point of view is characterized by the habit of alleging that some concrete phenomenon, in this case an individual, is the phenomenon in general. Thus we are entangled in the meaningless dualism of the concrete and the general, while the theory of understanding demonstrates beyond peradventure that the general arose out of the concrete, that the absolute is composed of the relative, the eternal of the temporal, the infinite of finite phenomena.

Since every part of the universe partakes of its infinite nature, a finite infinity might appear as an absurd contradiction. But this contradiction is solved as soon as we consider any concrete phenomenon in relation to the universe, in which the former is relative as compared to the absolute cosmos. We arrive at the concept of the infinite only by means of finite phenomena, in such a way that the force of thought is compelled to draw always certain lines of distinction, which on closer scrutiny appear as merely formal ones. For we may positively range one phenomenon after another in line, either downward in the dissection of the atom, or upward in the agglomeration of the universe, without ever coming to a beginning or an end. In the same way we arrive at the concept of eternity by means of incessant additions of time. The concept of an organic universe has at least the same importance for a scientific conception of the world that the changeability of magnitudes to the infinitely small or infinitely great has for higher mathematics, or that the scientific role of the atom is playing in chemistry, or the molecule in physics. The statement of the fact that our mind can take its departure only from objective sense-perceptions in order to arrive at general concepts, the revelation of this peculiarity of the force of thought, furnishes us with the basic method for all scientific work, namely, the critically inductive method. We have but to apply this method consistently in order to find that it leads to the dissolution of religion and of all theological, purely deductive and dualistic, philosophies. Religion is then replaced by the organic conception of the world, which satisfies sentimental fantasy as well as sober reason. The religious feeling of infinity and need of a unifying principle are satisfied by the understanding of the organic universe. Speculative philosophy renounces its seat in favour of the science of understanding. The breast of man is delivered from the nightmare of all spooks, because at last he may exult freely and acknowledge with modest pride that he is a conscious member of society and of the universe. Dietzgen's theory of understanding completes the victory of Marxism over all priests, philosophers, anarchists and champions of the dualistic method of thought, by supplementing and perfecting the unitary and organic conception of society typical of historical materialism by the monistic conception of the universe. It proves far more thoroughly than the many well-founded references to the results of natural science, especially of biology, quoted by Haeckel, that the social determinism of typical Marxism for the human individual is substantiated by the determinism of cosmic interrelations. The monism of Haeckel suffers in the first place from the fact that he fancies he can discover the peculiar nature of the force of thought by biological analyses. Haeckel does not understand that his biological researches will, indeed, supply us with proofs of the interrelation of mind and body, but can give but scant information as to the peculiar nature of the force of thought. He overlooks the fact that the force of thought as such can be studied only by an analysis of its expressions and functions, so that it is the critique of the faculty in action which alone can give us any clues. Apart from the fact that Haeckel has taken little heed of the study of social interrelations and their laws, so that he imagines that he can abolish social evils after the manner of the liberals by first educating the masses intellectually, instead of realizing that intellectual training can produce such results only upon the basis of definite economic conditions, his monism is infected by dualistic spooks especially for the reason that he has not settled his account fully with the crowning result of philosophy, the theory of understanding. This becomes particularly plain by his 19th thesis for the "organization of Monism," Frankfort on Main, 1904, where he says: "For our modern science, the concept of a god is tenable only on the condition that we mean by 'god' the last unknowable cause of all things, the inscrutable hypothetical 'arch-cause of substance.' "

There we have once again that sad half-heartedness of the so-called free-religious, but at bottom still theological "ignorabimus" of Dubois-Reymond, after the tune of: "Religion, that is to say, bondage to supernatural ideas, must be preserved for the people."

The reader sees, then, that Haeckel belongs to those biased thinkers, who have not become conscious of the absolute premise of thought, the existing natural and objective reality of the universe. We, on the other hand, know, thanks to our understanding of the interrelations of the mind, that the law of causality is necessary to the human mind merely as one of its forms of explanation, and applies indeed to all concrete phenomena of the universe, but not to the universe itself, because the latter is its own cause and effect, without beginning and end, in short the absolute.

We agree to the natural unknowableness of the known final cause of all things. But this natural miraculousness does not apply to the cosmic final cause alone, but also to every one of its phenomena, which are likewise inexhaustible. However, it must be emphasized that this is merely a trivial and natural miraculousness, which is founded in the nature of our force of understanding, for this phenomenon of the universe cannot get beyond the universe, it cannot exhaustively perceive the nature of things either in general or in concrete, and dissolve, as it were, the objective reality of any phenomenon by pure reason. It is because Haeckel does not explain this point from the standpoint of a consistent theory of understanding, that his monism retains a last refuge for the mystic faith in a supernatural force of understanding, or a mystic final cause. But Dietzgen's critique of the force of understanding demonstrates, that a supernatural force or cause is an absurdity, as every one may verify for himself. Haeckel is one of the most advanced and frank liberal thinkers. A proletarian conscious of his position in society and the universe is grateful to this prominent scientist for his painstaking research in the field of biology, which furnishes valuable proofs for the world-conception of critical communism. But Haeckel's monistic half-heartedness in matters of the "final unknowable cause of all things" is supplemented on the part of the enlightened proletariat. by Dietzgen's monistic theory of understanding. This theory, coupled to historical materialism, offers a reconciliation also to the socalled communist-anarchist, who is interested in the freest possible development of everybody's personality.

The proletarian conception of the world overcomes among other contradictions also the antagonism between egoism and altruism, for it is critical communism which makes the harmonious development of all the indispensable condition for the development of the individual. Individual powers will reach their highest development only when critical communism will have triumphed. Then the individual will make all others happy, and vice versa. It will be a society of all and of the individual on the solid basis of consciously socialized means of production, which were created by the proletariat and organized by capitalism.

Then begins the era of godless freedom, which proclaims that evolutionary revolution will endure for ever. The egoistic altruists scatter the clerical, liberal, and social priesthood. The cosmic dialectics takes root in the heart and brains of men. Objective reality sits victoriously enthroned, and stamps its ruling seal at last, with the conscious knowledge of mankind, upon all terms, conceptions, and actions, which seek favour in the eyes of the majority. Dialectically organized society secures the freest expression to science and art by abolishing the cares for the daily bread. The proletariat is the bearer of this greatest of all social movements ever recorded. The individual who consciously takes part in it, avows to himself: I entrust my affairs to the understanding of the laws of society and of the universe, to which I owe the knowledge that I must develop my personality, not in a struggle against, but in alliance with those social and cosmic interrelations, whose proudly modest member I am.